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Download PDF. Tough to say the same for the U. True, Congress has proved an enduring political institution as Madison surely intended. But Congress today often misses the Madisonian mark. Madison embedded Congress in a broader political system that dispersed constitutional powers to separate branches of government, but also forced the branches to share in the exercise of many of their powers.
Second, Madison expected that Congress would dominate the political system: Article 1 amassed significant political authority in the legislature, empowering new national majorities to solve public problems. As political scientist Charles Stewart has observed, Article I—which established the blueprint for Congress—was fairly prescriptive, encompassing more than half of the constitutional text.
Instead, Madison believed that creating competing power centers within the political system would compel politicians to compromise: They would otherwise be unable to secure favored policy outcomes as they required agreement of the other chamber and the president. The interest of the man must be connected to the constitutional rights of the place. Historian Jack Rakove points out this ambiguity, noting that even in Federalist 51 Madison says little about how such attachments would form.
Madison, Rakove reminds us, does suggest that senators and the president may find common cause in the exercise of their shared powers over diplomacy and nominations to check an overly ambitious House. Who else in a system that separated powers within and across the branches would have an incentive to protect or exploit pivotal congressional powers?
Counter-balancing political ambitions served another purpose as well. A focus on fostering energy and action within the legislative branch contrasts sharply with perhaps the most commonly believed wisdom about the Constitution: That Madison bequeathed us a political system designed not to work. According to this view, fear of a powerful executive led Madison and many of his colleagues at the Constitutional Convention to appreciate—even prefer—governmental stalemate.