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The question is not what concessions Ukraine should eventually make, but what might compel Russia to negotiate in the first place. The first argues that Ukraine will have won when it reclaims all its territory.
The second suggests that wars end through negotiation and that to secure a peace, concessions must be made. Until that changes, the war will continue. The latest theory may be as tenuous as its predecessors, but it will take longer to disprove by action unless Russia can be convinced that its premises are flawed.
Throughout the war, the Kremlin has proven responsive to its understanding of its prospects. Faced with massive losses to hold its position outside Kyiv, the Russian military retreated. Confronted by the steady attrition of its most motivated assault troops in Kherson, the Russian military conducted a withdrawal far more orderly than any of its advances.
The key, therefore, is to show the Kremlin that its prospects in a longer war are poor. Until the Kremlin assesses its prospects to be deteriorating, it will not negotiate in earnest.
These concessions would be banked as progress before Moscow continued the war, since there would be nothing to compel Moscow to do otherwise. Given this context, debates among diplomats and academics as to what concessions might secure guarantees from Moscow are currently irrelevant. The viability of any serious negotiations must be built upon the battlefield successes of the Ukrainian army.