The makeover of Army Aviation in the wake of the Second Indochina War was actually a continuation of a process that had been ongoing during the s; when the U. Army, seeking to make itself useful on the nuclear battlefield of Europe, attempted the use of light aircraft and helicopters to shuttle ground troops to and from various quarters of the battlefield; along the lines of the Marine Corps with the Vertical Assault Concept, but which unlike the Army, was acclimating amphibious warfare to the nuclear age.
Then by , the Army had to do a degree turn, back to conventional warfare following Vietnam. In addition to the fact that Army Aviation, like the rest of the armed forces, were now going to have to pay for the political failures of Vietnam and learn to operate in a fiscal environment of, Less is More. And for this, the Army will again consult the lessons available from the Yom Kippur War.
For instance, the Sinai front in the south,. Under the command of Lieutenant General Saad El Shazli, the Egyptian Army forces which were employed in the crossing included 5 infantry divisions, 2 mechanized and 2 armored divisions and 9 separate brigades.
Altogether, the Egyptian Army had approximately 1, tanks committed to the operation. In addition, having experienced the ability of the Israeli Air Force to provide overwhelming close air support and battle interdiction, the Egyptians assembled over batteries of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles to provide an integrated air defense umbrella over the theater. The ADA umbrella was intended to deny the Israeli Air Force IAF the air supremacy which had been a critical element of Israeli victory in the war; and which the Egyptians had identified as the single greatest threat to a surprise crossing of the canal.
General Hamilton H. Howze referred to the above with his viewpoints on Army Aviation, as it prepared to continue its existence in the post-Second Indochina War era:.
