By Nathan A. Jennings Joint Force Quarterly Download PDF. F rom to , the United States and Mexico fought a controversial war to decide which of the great republics would be the dominant power in North America. Featuring a series of U.
S invasions that spanned from San Diego to Veracruz, the month contest included bloody set-piece battles between national armies, aggressive maritime blockades and amphibious assaults along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, and prolonged occupations that invited a savage guerrilla resistance. As historian K. The histories of the resulting American victory have largely credited a combination of U.
Army battlefield superiority and Mexican internal disunity for the outcome. However, while decisive victories at Palo Alto, Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, and Mexico City proved critical, deeper analysis reveals that it was rather a pragmatic willingness to form ad hoc partnerships between the U.
Army and the U. Navy—and to a lesser extent, the U. Marine Corps and the precursor to the U. Coast Guard, the Revenue Cutter Service—that provided the necessary capabilities to win and endure in enemy territory. Despite the lopsided outcome of the war, the American armies and fleets that relied on each other to invade Mexico began the conflict unprepared to devise and execute a joint expeditionary concept. The small U. This deficit consequently required individual commanders to negotiate command relationships and operational priorities in deployed settings, which predictably resulted in friction between outsize personalities and conflicting agendas.
Yet, while the absence of a preexisting joint framework created challenges, the U. The outbreak of general war between the United States and Mexico in April found both republics unprepared for a continental conflict. Though the Americans boasted a larger population and industry, they began the war with a Regular Army of just 7, men conducting mostly frontier and garrison duties.
